Believing mutually is an important premise to ensure that cooperation among multiple agents goes smoothly. However, mutual belief among agents is always considered for granted. In this paper, we adapt a method based on the position-exchange principle to reason about mutual belief among agents. To reason about mutual belief formally, we first use a process algebra approach, the pi-calculus, to formalize cooperation plans and agents, and then bind the position-exchange principle into the inference rules. By reasoning about mutual belief among agents, we can judge whether cooperation among agents can go on rationally or not.
Introduction
Cooperation among agents is one of the keys to drawing multiple intelligent systems together [6] . Cooperation among multiple agents should meet at least three criteria: 1) agents should response mutually, 2) all agents should make joint commitments, 3) each agent should be committed to supporting inter-actions [1] . That is, every agent participating in cooperation must believe that any other agents are honest and will take actions following a specific cooperation plan, and vice versa. Shortly, all agents involved in cooperation must believe each other mutually.
Generally, once after an agent takes an action, it must expect to observe a specific result or response from others so that it could conclude whether it can believe others or it is believed by others. If any agent participating in cooperation believes that it itself is believed by others and others are believable as well, we will say that those agents believe each other mutually and the cooperation will proceed smoothly. However, in a distributed system, an agent almost knows nothing about others, thus it can only reason about the others' knowledge based on its own knowledge. To achieve that, an agent has to assume that others will think and act in a similar way as itself. In this paper, we adopt a technique using the positionexchange principle to reason about mutual belief between agents.
The position-exchange principle means that one will put him in others' position and judge others' feelings by his own. In other words, when one wants to reason about another, he will take the view of the other and thinks as if he were the other. For example, to reason about another's knowledge, one may say "If I did it, I believe that if he were me he would do it under the similar circumstance, too." In a logic system, the position-exchange principle can be described as the following formula. It means if A believes that β will be held under condition α, A will believe as well that B will believe the similar conclusion β{B/A} will be held under the similar condition α{B/A}.
When we were using the position-exchange principle, we need not only substitute those variables related to agents but also transform the actions associated with agents since one does not know how the other acts. However, in a general logic framework, we cannot reason about actions. So we use process algebra, the picalculus, to reason about mutual belief among agents. In the pi-calculus, actions of the pi-calculus processes occur in pairs and are mainly for communicating. Thus when we use the position-exchange principle, we can reason about other's belief by substituting both variables and mutual complementary input/output actions.
In the following sections, we first give the formal framework in section 2. Then in section 3, we formally describe what an agent, a cooperation plan, and cooperation look like. In section 4, we define inference rules based on the positionexchange principle for reasoning about mutual belief among agents, and then use them to reason about the rationality of specific cooperation among agents. The last section offers some conclusions.
The Formal Framework
In this paper, we adopt a process algebra approach, the pi-calculus [5] , to formalize agents, plans, and cooperation.
In the pi-calculus, there are only two kinds of entities: processes and channels, where processes are active components of a system and they communicate with each other through ports (or names) connected via channels. The processes in the picalculus have the following forms.
Where, I is a finite set. Σ i∈I π i • P i represents to execute one of these I processes and when I = ∅ we mark Σ i∈I π i • P i as 0, which is inert. x(y) and y x represent that name y will be input/output along channel x, respectively, whereas τ represents a silent action. P|Q represents the parallel composition of two processes of P and Q. !P represents any number of copies of P. (νx)P introduces a new channel x with scope P, where v is the constriction operator. [x = y]P means that process P will proceed only if x and y are the same channel, where [x = y] is the matching operator.
In the pi-calculus, the computation and the evolution of a process are defined by reduction rules. The most important reduction relation is about communication.
It means that the process will reduce into the right form after the communication, and meanwhile all free occurrences of z in Q will be substituted with y.
Agents and Their Cooperation
Though an agent is an active entity with pro-activities, it should take actions complying with the global cooperation plan. In this section, we first define cooperation plans formally as the pi-calculus processes. And then we define agents formally and show how to bind agents together to perform the cooperation plan.
Cooperation Plan
A cooperation plan is always composed of a series of tasks, among which there are some specific relationships to coordinate their performing. In general, a cooperation plan can be viewed as a tree, in which nodes are tasks to be allocated to agents; and relationships among tasks can be mapped to relationships among nodes. A cooperation plan can be defined recursively as follows. 1. The cooperation plan has a hierarchical structure, which is represented as a tree. 2. Any task is corresponding to a node within the plan tree. The global task, P, corresponding to the global plan, is the root of the plan tree, and Plan = def P. 3. If a task P consists of a set of sub-tasks, P 1 , P 2 , …, P n , the node corresponding to the task will have as many children-nodes as the sub-tasks. And P = def P 1 | P 2 | … | P n . 4. Among those sibling nodes, there are two categories of relations. If there is a unary relation over P i or a binary relation over P i and P j (1≤ i ≠ j ≤ n), P i , P j , and P may need to be redefined. 4.1. Unary relation: Repetition. It means that the corresponding task needs to be performed many times. And P i = redef !P i . 4.2. Binary relations. There are four kinds of binary relations between sibling nodes, serialization, synchronization, sequence, and parallel 1 . 4.2.1. Serialization. It means that the performing order of two tasks is not important, but the two tasks cannot be carried on concurrently. And
, and 1 While defining the plan process, we require that serialization relations must be considered first, and then synchronization and sequence; otherwise, deadlocks may be brought into the plan process. For example, consider three sub-processes, P, Q, R, among which P and Q must be performed serially and R must be carried on before both P and Q. 
. Then, if Q communicates with S pq before P has a chance to do so, a deadlock will occur.
is like a pv semaphore controller in operating systems. 4.2.2. Synchronization. Two tasks with a synchronization relation must be performed at the same time. And
, and
The performing of two tasks should be controlled under a restricted order, i.e., one must precede the other. And
Parallel. They can even be carried on concurrently. For that case, processes need not to be redefined. 5. There are no any other kinds of nodes or relations within the plan tree except for those defined above. For example, in an electronic commerce community, a price negotiation procedure can be planned as the repetition of price bargaining between two parties (figure 1). In the plan, the bargaining process, which is divided into two sub-processes of price asking and striking, will repeat for any times until both sides make a deal. For the price-asking process, it is divided further into two sub-processes, a process asking a price and then the other waiting for a stroked price. For the price-striking process, it is also divided into two sub-processes, one waiting for a price and then the other striking a price back. Once someone (for instance, the bargaining initiator) thinks the stroked price is acceptable, it can stop bargaining and make a deal.
The plan shown in figure 1 can be expressed in the pi-calculus as follows. 
When representing a cooperation plan in the pi-calculus processes, we add some new communicating ports to control the execution of sub-processes so that we could represent relationships within a composition process. Generally, when there are relationships such as serialization, synchronization, and sequence in a system, there may occur deadlocks. Fortunately, by using the procedure described above, we can get a non-deadlock plan process if there is no deadlock among the plan tree. Proposition 1. If there is no deadlock among the plan tree, the corresponding composition process of the plan will be deadlock free.
The proof is quite simple. As discussed above, we can first eliminate the possibility of a deadlock lying in serialization and synchronization relations. On the other hand, any two synchronized processes cannot have sequence relations with another process simultaneously, and vice versa. That is to say, any sequence relations and synchronization relations are impossible to bring a cyclic waiting-chain into processes if there is no cyclic waiting-chain occurring in the plan tree. Thus, we can say that the translation described above is deadlock free.
Agent
In a cooperative environment, an agent must undertake tasks to cooperate with others by complying with a certain cooperation plan. We can define an agent as an entity that includes actions, tasks it undertakes, and behavior specifications consistent with a specific cooperation plan. To represent the behavior specifications of an agent, we define a function of expectation from actions to actions to indicate that the agent expects to conceive what kind of response after it takes an action. An agent is an 4-ary tuple. A = <A, T, E, B>
Where, A is an action set, T is a collection of tasks, E is A's expectations and defined as a function E : A → A, and B is A's beliefs.
Components of Agents can be defined on the pi-calculus formally, in which the action set A is a set of pi-calculus actions, the task set T is a collection of pi-calculus processes, and for any process P ∈ T and P = γ • P', γ ∈ A.
Suppose that α, β ∈ A, then E(α) = β means that if the agent A takes action α, it will expect that action β to happen. In general, we can say that only when an agent is waiting for something does it expect that thing to appear, so we will only define an agent's expectations on its input actions. Then if E(α) = β, α can be either an input or an output, but β must be an input action.
For any process P ∈ T, suppose that P has the following form. m m
Where, α is an input/output action, and β is an input action. Then E(α) = β.
In addition, suppose that the agent is assigned two tasks within a cooperation plan, P 1 and P 2 , if there is a sequence relation between them, and
Since each agent has its own actions, tasks, expectations, and beliefs, A, T, E, and B can be viewed as functions with the domain of agents. In the rest context, we use A(A), T(A), E(A), and B(A) to denote the action set, the task set, the expectations, and the beliefs of A, respectively.
In this paper, we will only consider such kind of beliefs as whether an agent trusts others, whether the agent is trusted by others, and so on. For convenience, we mark x ∈ B as A b x. Suppose there is a set of agents, Ag, and A, B ∈ Ag, then A b B means A trusts B, whereas A b (B b A) means A believes that B trusts A as well.
Bind Agents into the cooperation plan
The cooperation plan is only a cooperation blueprint or specification of tasks, which does not provide concrete actions or functions to perform those tasks. After cooperation is planned, tasks should be assigned to cooperative agents.
For example, if we allocate those tasks shown in figure 1 to a seller agent, S, and a buyer agent, B, for instance, P 0 , P 1 , P 11 , P 111 , P 112 , P 2 , and P 21 to S, and P 12 , P 121 , P 122 , and P 22 to B, agent S and B can be defined as follows. Where, α and α represent actions "asking a price" and "waiting for an asked price" respectively, ω and ω represent actions "striking a price" and "waiting for a stroked price", and 1 ο asks "Accept the price or not?" and then 2 ο waits for the answer. Functions CalculatePrice S (p) and CalcuatePrice B (p) are used to calculate a new asking price and a new striking price, respectively.
For agent S's expectations, they mean that the seller hope that it will receive a response after each round of bargaining and the buyer will acknowledge its any questions. For agent B's expectations, the buyer may expect that the bargaining must be initiated by someone else, and after it strikes a price it may hope that the seller asks a new price or makes a deal with it.
To assemble cooperative agents into the cooperation plan, we should connect the abstract plan specification with those concrete implementations of agents' functions. In the pi-calculus, we can use the following method to achieve that.
First, we view the tasks occurring in the plan process as pointers and then make those pointers point to the functions provided by agents. For example, suppose that P i is a task in the plan process and has been assigned to agent A, who will undertake that task by taking action T a , then we can define following processes. On the other hand, an agent may undertake several tasks, for instance, T 1 , T 2 , …, T k ∈ T(A), then T(A) can be re-defined as a composition of processes.
Thus, a cooperation system with a cooperation plan, Plan, and a collection of cooperative agents, A 1 , A 2 , …, A n , can be defined as follows.
Reason about Mutual-Belief
In this section, we will define some inference rules for reasoning about mutual-belief among agents. While defining those rules, we mix the position-exchange principle into the definitions. And then we will describe in what condition agents will believe each other mutually.
Rules on Beliefs
To define rules on beliefs, we should first know what actions are observable to an agent. To represent an agent obseves an action γ, we assign the form
Intuitively, if an action is observable in a process, it is also observable to the agent.
In general, An agent knows nothing about others. To build beliefs on others, it can only base on those messages it has sent and received. However, not all messages it receives are something that it is waiting for or expecting. So, in our definitions of rules on beliefs, we include the expectations of agents as premises and then agents will only believe things that they are expecting.
Based on the position-exchange principle, an agent can derive beliefs on it from messages it receives, and then derive beliefs on others from messages it sends.
Belief about honesty of the other
If the agent receives a message that it is expecting, it will believe that the sender agent is trustable.
Where, α can be an input/output action, whereas β must be an input action.
Belief on the other's belief
Correspondingly, under the position-exchange principle, A will believe that agent B also trusts it if A responds a message to B as B requests.
While using the position-exchange principle in the above rule, we do not substitute all occurances of A. Instead, we just replace the action β with its complement one β since A may not be clear how the receiver, B, is evolving.
Mutual Belief among Agents
Informally, we say two agents have built mutual belief if both of them trust each other and each of them believes that it counterpart also trusts it. Then, the mutualbelief can be defined formally in several groups of beliefs. For a cooperation plan, in which its tasks are allocated to cooperative agents, if those agents cannot build mutual belief during cooperation, we will say that cooperation will not proceed smoothly and it is irrational. In other words, to build mutual belief among agents is the least requirement for cooperation.
Definition: At-Least-Rationality of cooperation. If agents can build mutual belief during cooperation, we say that cooperation is at least rational.
Reason about Mutual Belief among Agents -an Example
Consider the example shown in figure 1 again, the complete plan, and parts of agent S and agent B are redefined as follows. 
Then the procedure to reason about mutual belief between S and B can proceed at the same time while the computation between S and B is going on. 
Now, although the computation between S and B does not finish, the mutual belief has been built between them. If we reason about further, we can only enhance the mutual belief. Thus we can say the cooperation between S and B is rational.
Conclusions
In [1] , it gave three criteria for cooperation among multiple agents. Briefly, to cooperate, all agents must believe each other mutually. However, cooperation schemes in current literatures take mutual belief for granted [2] [3] [4] [6] [8] , and they always assume that cooperating agents believe each other mutually, which will leave many chances for malicious agents to do harms on cooperation. Only when we know that every agent participating in the cooperation believes each other mutually can we say that the cooperation will go through smoothly.
In this paper, to reason about mutual belief among agents, we adopt a technique using the position-exchange principle. By using those inference rules based on the principle, we can reason about an agent's beliefs on it and on others. In [7] , a Intuitively, this rule says that if A believes that B believes some implication is held, then once A believes that B believes the premise of the implication is satisfied then A will also believe that B will believe the result of the implication is implied.
That inference rule has several main differences from ours. First, it requires that A must have already had beliefs on B. Second, the rule can only be applied to the circumstance that all agents have completely common knowledge. However, in a distributed environment, agents are incapable of owning knowledge or beliefs about others in advance, and it is impossible for agents to possess all knowledge dispersed within the environment, either, which will lead the above rule unsuitable for real distributed systems.
Before defining the position-exchange principle in inference rules, we first take a process algebra approach, the pi-calculus, to formalize cooperation plans and then define an agent as an entity with actions, tasks, expectations, and beliefs. While defining the inference rules for reasoning about mutual belief, we take an agent's expectations into consideration and bind the expectations with its beliefs together so that the agent will only believe what it is expecting. Thus once mutual belief is built among agents; we will be able to say that the cooperation will go on rationally.
